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Krzysztof Malarz1, ∗ and Krzysztof Kułakowski1, †
1AGH University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Physics and Applied Computer Science,
al. Mickiewicza 30, 30-059 Krakow, Poland.
A new model of collusions in an organization is proposed. Each actor ai=1,··· ,N disposes one
unique good gj=1,··· ,N . Each actor ai has also a list of other goods which he/she needs, in order
from desired most to those desired less. Finally, each actor ai has also a list of other agents, initially
ordered at random. The order in the last list means the order of the access of the actors to the good
gj . A pair after a pair of agents tries to make a transaction. This transaction is possible if each of two
actors can be shifted upwards in the list of actors possessed by the partner. Our numerical results
indicate, that the average time of evolution scales with the number N of actors approximately as
N2.9. For each actor, we calculate the Kendall’s rank correlation between the order of desired goods
and actor’s place at the lists of the good’s possessors. We also calculate individual utility funcions
ηi, where goods are weighted according to how strongly they are desired by an actor ai, and how
easily they can be accessed by ai. Although the individual utility functions can increase or decrease
in the time course, its value averaged over actors and independent simulations does increase in time.
This means that the system of collusions is profitable for the members of the organization.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s,89.65.Ef,89.75.-k,89.75.Fb
Keywords: Social and economic systems; Social organisations; anthropology; Complex systems; Structures
and organisation in complex systems
I. INTRODUCTION
An ambitious and careful program of social research
on organizations, known as Strategic Analysis (SA), has
been framed nearly 40 years ago by Crozier and Fried-
berg [1]. The key idea of SA is that the structure and
activity in organizations are shaped by the relations of
power. Further, an actor is autonomous, hence her/his
behaviour is uncertain and this uncertainty is an ingredi-
ent part of the actor’s power over other actors. Further,
each organization is contingent; it comes out as an arti-
ficial construct to solve a given problem. Therefore any
theory which tries to derive a characteristics of an orga-
nizations from ’natural’ conditions is doomed to failure.
These frames make SA applicable to qualitative discus-
sions of specific case studies as of Airbus [2], Lidl [3], or
selected (unnamed) universities [4], but particularly diffi-
cult to be translated into terms of a formal model of some
generality. Also, any such translation contains elements
which are necessarily arbitrary.
Yet, only recently the task has been undertaken in a
few directions. Particular configurations of the relations
of power in an organization (principal, supervisor, agent)
have been investigated by Vafaï [5, 6], who analysed cou-
plings between different kinds of collusions in terms of
mathematical theorems. The approach by Sibertin-Blanc
and coworkers [8–10] develops the frames of SA in a con-
sistent and methodical way. In this approach, each agent
(actor) controls some relations which other agents can
profit by. Also, each agent distributes his own stakes
over the relations he/she can profit by. As an outcome
∗ http://home.agh.edu.pl/malarz/; malarz@agh.edu.pl
† kulakowski@fis.agh.edu.pl
of this game, played by all agents simultaneously, they
get their capacities, which depend on both the relations
and the stakes. In Ref. [10], the algorithm—termed as
SocLab—is applied to the case of management of floods
of the Touch river in France.
The aim here is to analyse in detail one particular as-
pect of SA, i.e. binary collusions. By a collusion we
mean, after Ref. [11], secret agreement or cooperation es-
pecially for an illegal or deceitful purpose. We are not
interested, however, in specifying to what extent the col-
lusions to be simulated are illegal or even deceitful. We
are going to concentrate on the process of establishing
a hierarchy in an organization. Similarly to the papers
reported above, our motivation is to refer to the frames
of SA, as described by Crozier and Friedberg [1]. Yet,
it seems to us that the process of setting of hierarchies
(ST) is at least as close to SA as the algorithm SocLab
[10]. In particular:
• as stated in Ref. [1], there are always some relations
of power in an organization; a simulation of ST
should reproduce their dynamics;
• as stated in Ref. [1], an organization itself is a social
construct; so is the hierarchy, constructed individ-
ually by each actor;
• the actors are of limited rationality and limited
information; therefore they do not plan their be-
havior in long time scale, just—as also stated in
Ref. [1]—catch occassions;
• for the same reason, actors can neither predict nor
control the behaviors of other actors, as those main-
tain their spheres of uncertainty. A successful coop-
eration with one actor does not preclude its future
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2breaking for the sake of a more profitable coopera-
tion with another actor;
• a game composed of binary subgames seems more
realistic than a collective reorientations of relations,
with perfect information available immediately for
all agents.
Last but not least, as it will be shown below, the only
parameter of our model is the number of agents. Ob-
viously, our approach is rather explanatory than predic-
tive. Yet it seems to us worthwhile to try to understand
a selected process of SA, even if its description remains
separated from particular case studies.
Our scenario is as follows. In a set of agents, each agent
disposes some kind of resources. Also, each agent needs
resources of all other kinds, with his/her individual order
of needs. Finally, each agent has a list of all other agents,
with their hierarchy equivalent to their order in the list.
Once two agents simultaneously find that it would be
profitable to be advanced in the hierarchy of the other
agent, they shift each other upwards by one position.
Then, the lists of hierarchies are the only elements which
evolve.
In the next section II, our algorithm is explained in
details. The Sec. III presents results of computer simula-
tions. Finally, Sec. IV contains discussion of the results
and conclusions.
II. MODEL
Let A = {a1, · · · , aN} and G = {g1, · · · , gN} denote
sets of N agents and N goods, respectively. Every agent
i posses single and unique good σi ∈ G, i.e.
(σ1, σ2, · · · , σN ) = P(G), (1)
where P(G) denotes a random permutation of set G.
Every agent i desires all other (N − 1) goods in a given
order
~ξi = P(Gi), (2)
where P(Gi) is a random permutation of set Gi =
G \ {σi}. A sequences ~ξi do not change during simula-
tion. Every agent i orders sequentially all other (N − 1)
agents. This order is represented as a sequence ~ζ ti which
may evolve during time t. Initially, the list ~ζ 0i is chosen
randomly, i.e.
~ζ 0i = P(Ai), (3)
where P(Ai) stands for a random permutation of set
Ai = A \ {ai}.
In each time step t a pair (am, an) of agents is selected
randomly. Let km denotes position of agent am in the
list ~ζ t−1n and kn denotes position of agent an in the list
~ζ t−1m . If simultaneously, item (km − 1) on the list ~ζ t−1n
and item (kn−1) on the list ~ζ t−1m represent agents which
have goods considered by agents am and an as less valu-
able than goods of agents in positions km and kn, then
transaction takes place. During transaction agents in po-
sitions (km − 1) and km on the list ~ζ tn are swapped. The
same procedure is realised on the ~ζ tm list, i.e. agents in
positions (kn − 1) and kn are swapped as well. We call
promoted and demoted agents ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of
the transactions, respectively.
The results are averaged over M independent simula-
tions, i.e. various sequences of (σ1, σ2, · · · , σN ) [Eq. (1)],
various hierarchies of agents goods ~ξi (i = 1, · · · , N)
[Eq. (2)] and various initial sequences ~ζ 0i [Eq. (3)].
Basically, the simulation is performed by subsequent
transactions between randomly selected pairs of actors,
if the transaction is profitable for both. We note however
that the system evolution is equivalent to a probabilistic
cellular automaton [12], where the rule is applied simul-
taneously to all the pairs, but the mutually profitable
transactions are performed with some small probability
pi. The condition of this equivalence is that pi is taken so
small as to exclude two simultaneous transactions of the
same actor in the same time step.
A. An example of model rules application
To illustrate the model’s rules let us consider a group
of N = 6 agents with their goods σi, hierarchy of goods
~ξi and initial hierarchy of agents ~ζ 0i :
a1 : σ1 = g1,
~ξ1 = (g6, g5, g3, g4, g2),
~ζ 01 = (a2, a6, a5, a4, a3),
a2 : σ2 = g6,
~ξ2 = (g2, g1, g5, g4, g3),
~ζ 02 = (a5, a4, a1, a6, a3),
a3 : σ3 = g5,
~ξ3 = (g1, g4, g3, g2, g6),
~ζ 03 = (a2, a4, a5, a1, a6),
a4 : σ4 = g2,
~ξ4 = (g5, g4, g6, g1, g3),
~ζ 04 = (a2, a5, a1, a6, a3),
a5 : σ5 = g3,
~ξ5 = (g5, g2, g6, g1, g4),
~ζ 05 = (a6, a4, a3, a1, a2),
a6 : σ6 = g4,
~ξ6 = (g2, g6, g5, g1, g3),
~ζ 06 = (a2, a1, a5, a3, a4).
(4)
• Let us assume that in t = 1 the pair (a2, a3) is
selected. In such situation a transaction will not
take place as agent a2 is already at the first posi-
tion on ~ζ 03 list and thus for every agent ~ζ 1i = ~ζ 0i
(i = 1, · · · , 6). Please note however, that simulta-
neously the agent a2 would like to promote agent
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FIG. 1. Time evolution of the Kendall’s rank correlation co-
efficient κ for various system sizes N = 6, 12, 24 from top to
bottom.
a3 and would like to demote agent a6, as σ3 = g5 is
higher (third) than σ6 = g4 (fourth) in agent a2’s
hierarchy of goods ~ξ2.
• Now, in t = 2, let a pair (a4, a6) is considered.
Agent a6 is located in ~ζ 14 list directly after a1 while
agent a3 is directly before a4 in ~ζ 16 list. Agent a4
would like to promote agent a6 and to demote agent
a1, as σ6 = g4 is higher (second) than σ1 = g1
(fourth) in agents a4’s hierarchy of goods ~ξ4. Agent
a6 would like to promote agent a4 and to demote
agent a3, as σ4 = g2 is higher (first) than σ3 = g5
(third) in agents a6’s hierarchy of goods ~ξ6. As
both agents a4 and a6 would like to promote each
other, the transaction takes place, what modifies
the lists ~ζ 24 and ~ζ 26 :
a4 :
~ζ 24 = (a2, a5, a6, a1, a3),
a6 :
~ζ 26 = (a2, a1, a5, a4, a3).
(5)
All other lists remain unchanged, i.e. ~ζ 2i = ~ζ 1i for
1 ≤ i ≤ 6 and i /∈ {4, 6}. Agents a4 and a6 are the
‘winners’ of the transaction, while ‘losers’ a1 and
a3 are demoted during this transaction.
• In the next time step a pair (a5, a1) is selected.
Agent a1 would like to promote agent a5 and to
demote agent a6, as σ5 = g3 is higher (third) than
σ6 = g4 (fourth) in agents a1’s hierarchy of goods
~ξ1. However, agent a5 does not want to promote
agent a1, as σ1 = g1 is lower (fourth) than σ3 = g5
(first) in agents a5’s hierarchy of goods ~ξ5. In this
time step the transaction is absent.
• In the fourth time step a pair (a5, a3) is selected.
An agent a4 is present in agent a5 list ~ξ5 directly be-
fore a3 and simultaneously he/she is directly before
agent a5 on ~ξ3 list. The good of agent a4 (σ4 = g2)
is less valuable for a3 than good σ5 = g3 and it is
less noteworthy than good σ3 = g5 for agent a5.
Thus agent a4 will be demoted on both lists and
he/she will become a ‘double-looser’ of this trans-
action.
a3 :
~ζ 43 = (a2, a5, a4, a1, a6),
a5 :
~ζ 45 = (a6, a3, a4, a1, a2).
(6)
All other list remain unchanged, i.e. ~ζ 4i = ~ζ 3i for
1 ≤ i ≤ 6 and i /∈ {3, 5}, etc...
B. The Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient.
Technically, in order to calculate Kandall’s τ coeffi-
cient (in this paper denoted as κ) one have to check
all possible pairs of (xi, xj) and (yi, yj) of sequences
~x = (x1, x2, · · · , xN ) and ~y = (y1, y2, · · · , yN ). Pairs
(xi, xj) and (yi, yj) are called concordant when xi < xj
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FIG. 2. Probability distributions ρ(∆κw,li ) of Kendall’s statistics changes during transactions ∆κ
w,l
i = κi(t + 1) − κi(t). The
circles and squares correspond to transactions ‘winners’ (w) and ‘losers’ (l), respectively.
and yi < yj (or xi > xj and yi > yj), while they are
called discordant if xi < xj and yi > yj (or xi > xj and
yi < yj).
The Kendall’s κ coefficient [13] is defined as
κ ≡ 2(p− q)
N(N − 1) , (7)
where p and q are numbers of concordant and discor-
dant pairs among
(
N
2
)
available pairs of N -items long
sequences ~x (and/or ~y).
The value of κ = +1 means that all pairs (xi, xj) and
(yi, yj) are concordant and κ = −1 only when all pairs
(xi, xj) and (yi, yj) are discordant.
C. The utility coefficient η.
We will show later (Sec. III B, Fig. 4) that Kendall’s
coefficient changes are not sensitive for all kinds of trans-
action results. Thus we propose another utility coefficient
ηi(t) ≡
N−1∑
j=1
α−
1
2 [j+νij(t)], (8)
where α ≡ 2, j marks position of the j-th good on the
list ξi, while νij(t) denotes i-th agent position in time t
on the list ~ζ tk , where k is the label of the agent ak having
good being j-th on ~ξi list.
For example, if the initial conditions are given by
Eq. (4) then ν1j(t = 0) are 3, 4, 4, 2, 3 and will be-
come 3, 4, 4, 2, 4 [ν1j(t = 2)] after transaction described
in Eq. (5) for j = 1, 2, · · · , 5, respectively.
In contrast to the Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient
−1 ≤ κ ≤ +1 only positive values of ηi are possible. The
maximal available value of ηi
ηmaxi =
N−1∑
j=1
2−(j+1)/2 =
(
1 +
1√
2
)
(1− 21/2−N/2) (9)
corresponds to the situation when agent ai is in the first
position on all ζj 6=i lists, i.e. νij = 1 for j = 1, 2, · · · , N−
1. And occurrence of the minimal available value of ηi
ηmini =
N−1∑
j=1
2−(j+N−1)/2 =
21−N · (√2− 2N/2)√
2− 2 (10)
means that the agent ai is in the last (N −1)-th position
on all ζj 6=i lists, i.e. νij = N − 1 for j = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1.
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FIG. 3. Time evolution of the parameters ηi(t) for N = 6, 12
and 24 agents. The ranges of possible ηi ∈ [ηmini , ηmaxi ] values
are indicated in sub-figures headlines.
Thus the parameter ηi(t) may measure the ‘prestige’ of
agent ai.
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FIG. 4. The comparison of time evolution of parameters κi(t)
(values on right axis) and ηi(t) (values on left axis) for two
agents (a) a1 and (b) a2 among group of a dozen of agents.
III. RESULTS.
A. Time evolution of the Kendall’s rank
correlation coefficient κ.
We apply Kendall’s rank correlation coefficient to mea-
sure the association between an order ~xi of goods in the
list ~ξi of i-th agent ~xi = (1, 2, · · · , N − 1) and sequence
~yi = (νi1, νi2, · · · , νi(N−1)) of agent ai’s positions on the
lists ~ζ tk 6=i, where k is the label of the agent having good
being j-th (j = 1, · · · , N − 1) on ~ξi list.
In Fig. 1 the time evolution of the Kendall’s rank cor-
relation coefficients κi for every agent i = 1, 2, · · · , N are
presented. Less than 100, 103 and 104 time steps are
necessary for reaching the steady state for the systems
containing N = 6, 12 and 24 agents, respectively.
In Fig. 2 the probability distributions ρ(∆κw,li ) of
Kendall’s statistics changes during transactions ∆κw,li =
κi(t+1)−κi(t) are presented. The indexes w and l denote
the transactions ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, respectively. The
distribution of ∆κi for transactions ‘winners’ ρ(∆κwi ) are
slightly shifted towards positive values of ∆κi in respect
to these distributions for transactions ‘losers’ ρ(∆κli). It
is worth to mention that changes in Kendall’s statistics κi
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FIG. 5. The time evolution of an average parameter η ≡ η¯i, where bar over symbol stands for an average over all N agents,
and 〈· · · 〉 is an additional averaging over M independents simulations. The solid red thick line corresponds to time evolution of
〈η(t)〉, while thin lines presents examples of η(t) evolutions in a single running. The values of 〈η(t)〉 is average over M = 103,
103, 103, 102 simulations for N = 12, 24, 48, 96 respectively.
do not distinguish between transaction results, i.e. these
differences may be positive for the ‘losers’ of transactions
and negative for the ‘winners’ of transactions.
B. Properties of η utility coefficient.
In Fig. 3 a time evolution of the utility correlation
parameters ηi(t) forN = 6, 12 and 24 agents is presented.
The changes in ηi(t) mark times t where transactions
take place. The increase (decrease) of ηi parameter is a
signature of winning (loosing) of the transaction by the
agent ai.
In Fig. 4 the comparison of time evolution of parame-
ters κi(t) and ηi(t) for two agents a1 and a2 among group
of a dozen of agents are presented. As one can see, the
increase of κi in time t may by accompanied by decrease
of ηi and vice versa. Moreover, sometimes the changes
of ηi are not associated with corresponding changes of κi
[see for instance jumps of η1(t) for t ≈ 250 and t ≈ 400
when κ1(t) is constant, as shown in Fig. 4(a)].
In Fig. 5 the time evolution of an average parameter
η ≡ η¯i for various system sizes N are presented. A bar
over symbol ηi stands for an average over all N agents.
Different green dotted curves represent various trajecto-
ries of η(t) for five among M various simulations. The
thick red solid line represents additional average 〈· · · 〉
over M simulations with M = 103, 103, 103 and 102
for N = 12, 24, 48 and 96, respectively. Although
a single agent may loose his/her ‘prestige’ during sys-
tem evolution—e.g. [ηi(t → ∞) − ηi(t = 0)] < 0, as for
agents a2 and a4 in Fig. 3(a)—and even temporally the
group of agents may loose their average ‘prestige’ η(t)
the difference [η(t → ∞) − η(t = 0)] is positive. More-
over, various simulation average out these local loses of
the group prestige η(t) and 〈η(t)〉 grows monotonically
with t. The latter means that, in average, the individual
loses of the ‘prestige’ [ηi(t+ 1)− ηi(t) < 0] by the trans-
action ‘losers’ ai are globally compensated by an increase
of ‘prestige’ of the transaction ‘winners’.
In order to quantitatively measure the average advan-
tage in transactions results between transaction ‘winners’
(w) and ‘losers’ (l) we check the probability distribu-
tions of utility parameter changes during transactions
∆ηw,li = ηi(t + 1) − ηi(t). In Fig. 6 these distributions
are presented for various system sizes N = 4, 6 and
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FIG. 6. Probability distributions of utility parameter changes during transactions ∆ηw,li = ηi(t + 1) − ηi(t). The circles and
squares correspond to transactions ‘winners’ (w) and ‘losers’ (l), respectively. In sub-figure (a) also available differences between
all possible values of ηi for N = 4 agents are marked by blue dashed impulses. In sub-figure (b) blue dashed impulses indicates
positions of −∆ηlm − ∆ηln (m 6= n), where −∆ηlm,n are values of the first component of ρ(−∆ηli) distribution. The latter is
marked as thick red impulses, while the second component of ρ(−∆ηli) is indicated with thin red lines.
12. The results are averaged over M = 105 indepen-
dent simulations. As the results are presented in semi-
logarithmic scale the values ρ(∆ηi = 0) are omitted, but
ρ(∆ηi = 0) > 0 occurs only for a small system sizes and
vanishes for N = 12 and larger.
As we mentioned earlier in Sec. III A and presented
in Fig. 2, the sign of changes ∆κi is not able to dis-
tinguish among the transactions ‘winners’ and ‘losers’.
In contrast, ∆ηi are positive for transaction ‘winners’
and they are negative for transaction ‘losers’. The abso-
lute values of averages for these distributions are larger
for transaction ‘winners’ than for transaction ‘losers’:
〈−∆η¯li〉 < 〈∆η¯wi 〉, where a bar over symbols stands for
an average over all N agents while 〈· · · 〉 indicates an av-
erage over M independent simulations. These averages
〈∆η¯w,li 〉 are indicated in Figs. 6(a)-(c) headlines.
The probability distribution ρ(∆ηwi ) for transaction
‘winners’ are smooth and equidistant (in logarithmic-
scale). The same distribution for the transaction ‘losers’
ρ(−∆ηli) may be split into two parts. The first com-
ponent of ρ(−∆ηli) is quite similar to ρ(∆ηwi ) except
of mentioned earlier small shift of its average towards
lower values. This component is assiociated with trans-
actions similar to those presented in Eq. (5), i.e. when
two differnt agents (al1 , al2 6=l1) stay a head of transac-
tion ‘winners’ (aw1 , aw2) on ζtw1 and ζ
t
w2 lists. The sec-
ond part of ρ(−∆ηli) is composed with plenty but seldom
observed changes ∆ηli occurring for N = 12 three orders
of magnitude less often than a mode of this distributions.
This part of ρ(−∆ηli) is associated with transactions with
‘double-losers’ [see Eq. (6)], when agent al is directly be-
fore ‘winners’ (aw1 , aw2) on ζtw1 and ζ
t
w2 lists. In such case
∆ηli is a result of two demoting operations. In Fig. 6(b)
blue dashed impulses indicates positions of ∆ηlm + ∆ηln
(m 6= n), where ∆ηlm,n are values of the first component
of ρ(∆ηli) distribution. And indeed, these positions per-
fectly match observed values of ∆ηli in the second com-
ponent of ρ(∆ηli) distribution.
To check how possible differences ∆ηli are realized dur-
ing transaction we checked the distribution of differences
of two sums
3∑
k=1
2−(k+νk)/2 −
3∑
m=1
2−(m+µm)/2 ≡ ∆ηth, (11)
where µm, νk = 1, 2, 3, what corresponds to possible
differences in ηi in the group of N = 4 agents. The
sums in Eq. (11) may be composed in 33 ways1 what
1 Please note, that for a group of N = 4 agents a number 33 = 27
is also a number of possible sequences νij , which appears in ηi
parameter definition [Eq. (8)].
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FIG. 7. Starting with exactly the same initial conditions—i.e. identical i) sequences of agents goods (σ1, σ2, · · ·σN ), ii) agents’
priories of goods ~ξi and iii) initial order of agents ~ζ 0i —the final hierarchies of agents ~ζ∞i may be different.
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(b) N = 24, M = 103
FIG. 8. The probability distribution of times necessary for reaching a steady state of the system. The results aver averaged
over M = 103 simulations and times τ data are binned in ∆τ = 50, 300 long classes for N = 12 and 24, respectively.
yields 272 possible differences ∆ηth. Of course, values of
∆ηth may be identical for various sequences µm=1,2,3 and
νk=1,2,3. The values of ρ(∆ηthi ) are presented on the right
axis of Fig. 6(a). The half of probability distribution
ρ(∆ηthi ) is marked in Fig. 6 as a dashed blue impulses,
except of value ρ(∆ηthi = 0) =
45
729 . The observed changes
∆ηw,li agree with their predicted positions ∆η
th
i , however,
only small fraction of available differences ∆ηthi is realised
during transactions.
In Fig. 7 again the time evolution of ηi(t) parame-
ter is presented. The M = 10 evolution of ηi(t) on ev-
ery sub-figure 7(a)-(d) correspond to the same agent ai
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FIG. 9. An average time 〈τ〉 vs. system size N . The data
are averaged over M = 105, 103, 103, 102, 102 for N = 6,
12, 24, 48, 96, respectively. The linear fit in logarithmic scale
indicates dependence 〈τ〉 ∝ Nγ , γ = 2.901, u(γ) = 0.011.
FIG. 10. Number of links ` among agents for their various
number N vs normalised time t/Tmax. M = 105, 105, 105,
105, 105 and τmax = 275, 1891, 11239, 77486 and 562925 for
N = 6, 12, 24, 48, 96, respectively.
(i = 1, . . . , 4). In all cases the initial conditions—i.e. i)
sequences of agents goods (σ1, σ2, · · ·σN ), ii) agents’ pri-
orities of goods ~ξi and iii) initial order of agents ~ζ 0i —are
identical. The only difference among these simulations is
a sequence of agents pairs (am, an) selected in subsequent
time steps t. With the same initial conditions the evolu-
tion of ηi(t) may lead to identical final sate [see Figs. 7(a)
and (d)] or not [see Figs. 7(b) and (c)]. But, in principle,
the final state of the whole system will be different for
different simulations...
C. Distribution of times necessary for reaching a
steady state of the system.
In Fig. 8 the probability distribution of times neces-
sary for reaching a steady state of the system for various
system sizes N are presented. The results aver averaged
over M = 105, 103, 103 simulations and times τ data are
binned in ∆τ = 1, 50, 300, long classes for N = 6, 12
and 24, respectively. For the smallest simulated system
(N = 6) plenty simulations do not contain any transac-
tion and thus ρ(0) > 0.
In Fig. 9 an average time 〈τ〉 of reaching the steady
state of the system for various system sizes N is pre-
sented. The 〈· · · 〉 symbol stands for an averaged over
M = 105, 103, 103, 102, 102 for N = 6, 12, 24, 48, 96,
respectively. The least squares fit in logarithmic scale
indicates dependence 〈τ〉 ∝ Nγ with γ = 2.901 and its
uncertainty u(γ) = 0.011.
D. Network of promoted agents.
In Fig. 10 the time evolution of a number ` of links
among N agents—i.e. the half of the number of unities
in an adjacency matrix which define the promoted agents
network topology—is presented. The adjacency matrix
is a symmetric binary matrix, which elements are zero
or one (amn ∈ {0, 1}, amn = anm) [14]. The nonzero
element of the adjacency matrix amn indicates that a
link among agent am and an exists. Initially, the ad-
jacency matrix does not contain any unities: amn = 0
for m,n ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}. Every time, when transac-
tion among agents am and an takes place, we set amn =
anm = 1 and al1l2 = al2l1 = 0, where l1,2 are the labels
of transaction’s ‘losers’ (al1 and al2). The results are av-
eraged over M = 105 simulations. As we mentioned in
Sec. III C the average times 〈τ〉 of reaching a steady state
of the systems scales roughly as Nγ and thus we present
time evolution of ` vs. normalised time t/τmax, where
τmax = max
1≤k≤M
(τk(N))
is the longest time τk(N) of reaching a steady state in
M simulations for fixed value of N . These times are
τmax = 275, 1891, 11239, 77486 and 562925 for N = 6,
12, 24, 48, 96, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 10, at the initial stage the number
of links increases. Once more and more transactions are
done, some links marking the previous transactions are
erased. The mean number of links in the stationary state
is roughly proportional to the system size. However, the
plot `(t) shows a flat maximum. This is a remarkable
result, because if the links are selected and erased ran-
domly, the time dependence of their number is known
to increase monotonously till a saturation. Apparently,
some kind of short-range order of selected links is active
here: as the number of links increases, the links between
the losers and the winners are preferably created between
10
 0.76
 0.78
 0.8
 0.82
 0.84
 0.86
 0.88
100 101 102 103
1
2
3
4
5
6
〈η
i
〉
(a) N = 6, ηmaxi ≈ 1.41
t
i
 0.48
 0.5
 0.52
 0.54
 0.56
 0.58
 0.6
100 101 102 103 104
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
〈η
i
〉
(e) N = 12, ηmaxi ≈ 1.67
t
i
 0.76
 0.78
 0.8
 0.82
 0.84
 0.86
 0.88
100 101 102 103
1
2
3
4
5
6
〈η
i
〉
(b) N = 6, a∗ = a1
t
i
 0.48
 0.5
 0.52
 0.54
 0.56
 0.58
 0.6
 0.62
 0.64
 0.66
100 101 102 103 104
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12〈
η
i
〉
(f) N = 12, a∗ = a1
ti
 0.74
 0.76
 0.78
 0.8
 0.82
 0.84
 0.86
 0.88
100 101 102 103
1
2
3
4
5
6
〈η
i
〉
(c) N = 6, a∗ = a3
t
i
 0.48
 0.5
 0.52
 0.54
 0.56
 0.58
 0.6
 0.62
100 101 102 103 104
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12〈
η
i
〉
(g) N = 12, a∗ = a4
ti
 0.74
 0.76
 0.78
 0.8
 0.82
 0.84
 0.86
 0.88
100 101 102 103
1
2
3
4
5
6
〈η
i
〉
(d) N = 6, a∗ = a6
t
i
 0.48
 0.5
 0.52
 0.54
 0.56
 0.58
 0.6
 0.62
 0.64
100 101 102 103 104
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12〈
η
i
〉
(h) N = 12, a∗ = a8
ti
FIG. 11. The time evolution of an average parameter 〈ηi(t)〉, where 〈· · · 〉 is an averaging over M independents simulations. In
sub-figures (a) and (e) agents a∗ with extra privileges for making transactions are absent.
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actors who did not cooperate yet. After a time, however,
the short-range order is destroyed, and the stationary
density of links is slightly lower than its maximal value.
E. The role of agents privileges.
According to Ref. [1], information plays a key role in
the distribution of power. In particular, the actual state
of transactions performed by an actor may remain hid-
den for other actors, and therefore may be an impor-
tant part of the related sphere of uncertainty. To check
how is works in our simulation, we allow one actor to
be completely informed on the state of the whole sys-
tem. This actor does not need to wait for the moment
when by chance he meets another actor with whom he
may decide to make a transaction. Instead, he can act
at every moment and therefore he has an effective pri-
ority to perform all transactions which are productive
for both contarctors. Namely, every time t when trans-
action among randomly selected agents (am, an) takes
place, this special agent a∗ is invited for taking part in
some extra transactions. These additional transactions
are performed until further agent’s a∗ promotions on any
of ~ζti lists (i = 1, · · · , N and i 6= ∗) are not possible.
In Fig. 11 the time evolution of utility parameters
〈ηi(t)〉 for several agents in N = 6 and N = 12 large
groups are presented. The symbol 〈· · · 〉 marks an av-
eraging procedure over M independent simulations. In
Figs. 11(a) and 11(e) the situations corresponding to the
absence of a∗ are presented. Also maximal available val-
ues of ηmaxi for N = 6 and 12 are printed there. The
agents a∗ priviledged to take part in these extra transac-
tions are indicated in the sub-figues headlines.
The privilege of additional transaction seems to have
only temporary effect on value of η∗, which grows in time
much faster than ηi 6=∗. In group of dozen agents N = 12
the increase of η∗ is observed until t ≈ 20 time steps.
After this time the additional transactions are not ob-
served and agent a∗ takes part in transaction only as a
loser. The ultimate values η∗(t→∞) are not much higer
than values observed without these additional transac-
tions [cf. Figs. 11(a) and 11(e)]. Please note, that also
largest value of the utility parameter
max
t
(η∗(t))
reached during simulation is definitely lower than its
maximal available value ηmaxi . The efect of additional
transactions manifest itself much weaker in the smaller
groups, and is almost invisible for N = 6.
It seems natural to state that the final state when all
profitable transactions are done can be interpreted as the
state of full information of all actors. Within these terms,
a nice conclusion of this part of calculations is that the
advantage of being informed works only when other ac-
tors remain uninformed.
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS.
Summarizing our main results, we can state at first
that the time of simulation is finite. The state at the
end of calculations is well defined: there is not a single
pair of agents which can carry out a mutually successful
transaction. When the time of evolution is averaged over
a number of simulations, its mean value varies as a power
law with the number N of agents. Further, the final state
depends not only on the initial order of all lists, but also
on the order of pairs which carry out their transactions.
Once this order is prescribed, the system evolution is
fully deterministic. Within our interpretation, this order
is determined by autonomous decisions of the actors. If
this is accepted, our numerical results indicate that the
final state of the system does depend on these decisions.
The latter conclusion is consistent with the postulate of
spheres of uncertainty, controlled by the actors [1].
With the results listed above, we gain an analogy be-
tween the characteristics of the final state and the re-
lations of power; recall the key role of the latter in the
writings of Crozier and Friedberg [1]. There, we find
statements that the power is a feature of a relation, and
not of the actors. Further, according to Ref. [1], the
power is intransitive, the power relations are not equiv-
alent, and the power can be identified as a difference in
profits of a cooperation. All these statements find their
counterparts in our formulation and our numerical re-
sults. In particular, if an actor A is at the first place in
the list of an actor B, and the actor B is not at the first
place in the list of an actor A, this means that the actor
B would like to be advanced in the list of A, but he has
nothing to offer. Accordingly, as we read in Ref. [1] the
power is an opportunity not to fulfill the partner’s wish.
Another result is that the time dependence of
the Kendall coefficients for individual actors is not
monotonous, and the same can be stated about the coeffi-
cient ηi. Recall that the Kendall coefficient is a measure
of the accordance of the individual rank of goods with
what can be interpreted as an access to those goods. For
an extremely successfull actor, who has number one in
the lists of all agents, the Kendall coefficient is expected
to be close to zero. Then, the role of a measure of suc-
cess is played by the utility parameter ηi, introduced as a
weighted sum of accesses to the goods; the weight is de-
termined by the number of the good at the actor’s list. It
is interesting that the value of the utility parameter, av-
eraged over all actors, does increase; the numerical eval-
uation gives roughly the same increase ∆η close to 0,04
for any system size. This can be interpreted as an ‘op-
timistic’ statement that the collusions are profitable for
the whole system. However, we stress that the profits are
directed only to the members of the organization, what
is not necessarily desirable for, say, the national health
service or a state university.
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